[Webinar] Red Sea Dialogues 4 – Balancing the Storm: Turkey’s Strategic Hedging between Middle East Turmoil and African Expansion

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As US–Iran talks and a new memorandum of understanding raise hopes for reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and as Turkey intensifies its confrontation with Israel while expanding its military footprint in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa, Ankara is emerging as a consequential actor in the region’s future.

From Camp TURKSOM—Turkey’s largest overseas military base—to a 2024 agreement to rebuild Somalia’s navy and the first public flights of Turkish F-16s over Mogadishu in 2026, Ankara has steadily expanded its influence across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Combining military partnerships, economic engagement, and humanitarian diplomacy, Turkey has become an increasingly adaptable regional power.

How is Ankara navigating the Middle East war while consolidating its role across the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Horn of Africa?

Join us for the fourth edition of the Red Sea Dialogues:
REDD 4: Balancing the Storm? Turkey’s Strategic Hedging Between Middle East Turmoil and African Expansion

The discussion will explore how Turkey is balancing competition and cooperation across the Red Sea region, the implications of its growing role in the Horn of Africa, and what Ankara’s strategy means for the future of regional stability, maritime security, and geopolitical competition.

Featuring:

• Jawhratelkmal Kanu – Political Economy Analyst and Development Practitioner
• Dr. Kaan Devecioglu – Coordinator of North & East Africa Studies, ORSAM
• Dr. Abdullahi Ali, PhD – Public Policy Expert, Nonprofit Executive and Social Enterprise Leader
• Dr. Ozge Genc – Visiting Fellow, Middle East Council on Global Affairs

Moderated by Dr. Dalia Ghanem, Senior Visiting Fellow, GMF South

🗓 Thursday, 2 July
🕒 15:00–16:30 CET

Join the conversation on zoom: https://lnkd.in/dVfMY_fc

Organized by the Mediterranean Platform and Pan African Agenda.

#RedSea#Gulf#MiddleEast#Geopolitics#HornOfAfrica#MaritimeSecurity#GCC#MediterraneanPlatform#Turkiye#RegionalSecurity

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Summary :

Turkey is currently operating an “intercoastal strategy” in the Red Sea. Starting from the assumption that maritime security begins on land, Ankara’s strategy has been focusing simultaneously on the waterway as well as on building relationships with coastal countries. The ongoing regional escalation – with its various fronts of conflict and the instability that it generates – makes this strategic choice even more desirable. Turkey is not only focusing on military projection (through military partnerships, armament sales, etc), but also on expanding its diplomatic influence through soft power strategies, development programs, and state-building processes.

Turkey’s foreign policy approach builds on the country’s two contrasting identities: on the one hand, Turkey’s is increasingly playing a role of middle power, offering itself as a platform for diplomacy and mediation; on the other hand, Ankara’s is growingly expanding its military footprint, as an exporter of arms and drones especially towards African countries. This double role is not seen as intrinsically incoherent though, as in the current international environment the capacity to mediate arises from the use of leverage on the ground. Ankara has also added humanitarian aid and emergency crisis management to its toolbox. Speed, flexibility, and pragmatism are key words to describe current Turkish foreign policy.

Somalia is a flagship case in Turkey’s Africa policy, with Ankara establishing itself as one of its main partners in the years after 2011. Turkey has been supporting the internationally recognised government for years now, with investments in infrastructures, human development, education, trade, defence and security, and energy. This has led Somalian society to widely accept Turkey as a trusted partner and reliable ally, while other countries have been criticised for their short-term approaches. Nonetheless, some see Turkey as taking advantage of the weaknesses of the country, using it in a larger proxy game, while also empowering the current governing leadership at the expense of opposition groups.

In Sudan, Turkey systematically engages with the military regime (SAF) and here as well it is conducting a double-edged policy, with both economic engagement (in agriculture, infrastructures, energy) and sustained military presence., Turkish investment has been preferred over others by the military regime given its lack of conditionalities. In this case as well, However, critics point to the inefficiencies of publicly funded but Turkish-owned investments and to the Turkey’s capitalisation on Sudan’s existing vulnerabilities. Turkey’s mediation efforts in Sudan are also complicated by the country’s stance in Libya, with its support of Tripoli but ambiguous stance towards the Eastern Libyan authorities.

Taken together, these cases reveal the limits of Turkey’s approach. The very flexibility and pragmatism that give Ankara its comparative advantage also create serious contradictions that risk undermining Turkey’s stance in the long run. Ultimately the main vulnerability for Ankara  is reputational: if Turkey is seen as just another actor exploiting instability rather than a genuine partner, its ability to mediate and project soft power will suffer. Internally, however, there is no real pressure to change. The defence industry benefits from military exports, the government uses Africa policy for electoral narratives, and opposition parties simply do not have Africa on their radar. Even a change in leadership would not automatically shift course, since there is no domestic constituency demanding accountability on these engagements. So, for now, the internal incentives continue to favour expansion, even as risks grow.