[Webinar] Red Sea Dialogues 3 – After the Fire: Will Gulf Countries Cooperate or Compete for the Red Sea?

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The Red Sea is no longer only a maritime corridor. It has become a frontline where geopolitical rivalries, economic interests, and security calculations increasingly collide.

As the consequences of the 2026 Middle East war continue to reshape the region, states in the Gulf and Horn of Africa are facing a new strategic reality.

Years of competitive influence across Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, Libya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt and the wider Horn of Africa are now meeting rising costs, direct spillovers, and growing pressure for coordination.

Will the post-war environment push GCC actors toward cooperation and collective security? Or will rivalry and proxies persist under new forms?

Join us for the third session of the Red Sea Dialogues webinar series:

“After the Fire: Will the Gulf Cooperate or Compete in the Red Sea?”

The discussion will bring together leading voices in regional security, geopolitics, and Gulf affairs to unpack the future of Gulf strategy and the evolving balance of power across the Red Sea corridor.

Featuring:
• Prof. Mahjoob Zweiri
• Dr. Ahmed Morsy
• Prof. Luigi Narbone
• Ms. Asma M. Ahmed
Moderated by Prof. Mehari Taddele Maru

📅 Thursday, June 4th
⏰ 15:00–16:30 CET

Join the conversation on zoom: https://lnkd.in/dBGVbPfR

Organized by the Mediterranean Platform and Pan African Agenda.

#RedSea#Gulf#MiddleEast#Geopolitics#HornOfAfrica#MaritimeSecurity#GCC#MediterraneanPlatform#Sudan#Yemen#RegionalSecurity

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Summary :

Almost three months after the start of the war, things don’t seem to be going according to US plans: Iran has been able to withstand the largest global military power, and the regime will likely emerge intact from the war. Its military capabilities continue to be effective, even if downgraded, and the newly acquired control over the Strait of Hormuz provides Iran with a crucial geopolitical card. Thus, the current delays in reaching an agreement are likely due to a US fear that any deal might mean an outright win for Tehran. Nonetheless, the prolonged regional war has weakened Iran regionally, especially in terms of its capacity to support its proxy network in Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq. On the Houthis specifically, their lack of support for Iran after 28 February is somehow surprising. Two possible reasons might be 1. a strategic calculation by Iran not to waste the Houthis limited weapon capabilities; or 2. the fact that the Houthis are in survival mode and cannot afford to use their remaining military power solely to help the Iranian regime, especially given their lack of domestic and international legitimacy. 

Generally, Iran perceives this war as existential, and all its actions over the past three months must be seen through this lens. What Iran is doing in the Strait is to raise the cost of this war for the entire world and set a precedent that can be used in the future. Incidentally, this also shows the importance of chokepoints, how they can be weaponised, and their interconnectedness at the regional level (not only the Strait of Hormuz, but also the Suez Canal and Bab El-Mandeb). The main goals behind the Iranian strategy are to end sanctions, get frozen funds back, and allow its oil to be sold freely in international markets. 

GCC countries were caught off guard by the war. Their historical reliance on the US security umbrella has proven to be inconsequential: American troops are not there to protect them, and their presence has been a source of vulnerability more than anything else. As a consequence, Gulf countries will likely reassess their security and defence posture, intensifying diversification. Primary examples are the security deal between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and the emergence of new alliances also involving Turkey and Egypt. Economically, GCC countries thought they would be immune to the instability of the broader region, which has proven false: investments are declining, foreign workers are leaving, and they will likely be more cautious about moving there in the future. Reconstruction will be costly. 

Looking specifically at the post-conflict role of the Gulf in the Red Sea, the discussion has suggested that both cooperation and competition will continue. There will be more securitisation, and alliances will weaken, but maritime security is crucial for all stakeholders and demands collaboration. The Horn of Africa cannot be separated from Gulf security dynamics, as the two regions are interconnected economically and strategically. Economic interdependence will be the driver of cooperation, as all actors have an interest in maintaining normal trade flows in the Red Sea. An important aspect that was raised concerned the importance of the private sector. Small to medium businesses are among the first to be struck by uncertainty. Shared economic interests will eventually create incentives for cooperation over competition. 

The war is basically over, but its impact will last. The international community is lost and seems unable to counter the continuing decline of the rule-based system. Coercion has taken the place of diplomacy, and no global power wants to uphold international law, or even pretend to do it. Europe could stand up and take a stance, but seems unable to act decisively in its neighbourhood, let alone in other regional scenarios.